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2ABSTRACT
Currently we are witnessing the disappearance of many man-made borders and
an increased international cooperation in the European Union. At the same
time, the former communist countries are going through a painful process of
economic transformation. Whether these developments lead to an open society
to the benefit of all actors in all regions, remains to be seen.
This paper addresses the issue of transborder investment in Eastern Europe by
Western companies. The paper contributes first, to a conceptual discussion on
borders and barriers, and the influence of borders and barriers on regional
development (Section 2). Furthermore, based upon a blend of applied studies,
the paper explores empirically transborder investment in Eastern Europe
(Section 3). Particular attention will be given to barriers to this investment
(Section 4). The paper proceeds with a discussion of factors that cause a
differentiation in regional development potentials in Eastern Europe, among
others a different attractiveness for foreign direct investment (Section 5). This
differentiation will be one of the ingredients in the design of scenarios for future
regional development in Eastern Europe in the concluding section.
KEY WORDS: borders, barriers, Eastern Europe, investment, scenario.
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31 . INTRODUCTION
To date, many political borders have disappeared or changed in
character, exemplified by the unification of Western Europe and the opening up
of the Eastern European power block. However, vanishing political borders do
not automatically imply more openness. On the one hand, mankind seems to be
keen in inventing new bottlenecks precluding a free movement of people, goods
and information. Self-interest or group interest is apparently a strong driving
force which is often at odds with the benefits of a borderless society. On the
other hand, the heritage of political borders in terms of cultural and institutional
differences may remain for a long time and prevent transborder cooperation.
Companies have many motives to seek cooperation abroad. All
motives however, are to be seen within attempts to maintain or increase profits
in an environment which is progressively competitive and global. Accordingly,
motives are cost-related, market-related or both. Involvement of companies in
business in foreign countries may take various. forms. Common examples are
strategic alliances, subcontracting and direct investment. Which of these modes is
chosen, is dependent upon a variety of economic and political influences in the
country of investment (such as market size, labour  cost, tariffs, exchange rates,
investment incentives, etc.) and on the needs of the fvms in question.
Foreign direct investment is investment in majority or partially
owned subsidiaries. This may be achieved in two ways, namely acquisition and
‘greenfield’ investment. In the latter, production facilities are established from
the very beginning. Clearly, risks in ‘greenfield’ investment are different from the
ones in acquisition of existing firms. Foreign direct investment is generally a far-
reaching (and less flexible) type of involvement in foreign business, for example
compared with strategic alliances.
The attraction of foreign direct investment is considered essenti-
al in Eastern Europe in order to pursue improvement of socio-economic
conditions. Foreign capital acts as a catalyst for various new developments. It is
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employment (although the initial effect is often the contrary). In addition,
foreign direct investment enhances the introduction of innovative products and
new production processes. For example, experiences in Hungary indicate that
foreign-owned companies spend much more on R & D than domestic ones [l].
The current ‘national systems of innovation’ in Eastern Europe
are still very much influenced by the peculiar features of the communist past [2].
First, there was a relative weakness of R & D and innovation on the enterprise
level. Innovation and R & D were traditionally found in branch level institutes.
A second feature was the relatively large contribution of the ‘Academy’ system to
basic and applied research. Consequently, there were no strong links between
knowledge sources and enterprises. It is the university and its new generation of
young engineers and scientists which form the greatest hope for the future
development of technology and innovation in Eastern Europe, rather than the
older generation in the Academy and branch institutes [2]. This deserves
particular attention in reform policies which accentuate the development of
business infrastructure for small high technology .companies.
Foreign direct investment can be considered as a specific form
of spatial interaction. Therefore, the article will first discuss borders and barriers
theoretically within a spatial interaction framework. In the empirical part,
attention will focus on specific barriers encountered by companies investing or
willing to invest in Eastern Europe. A differentiation in attractiveness for foreign
investment will then be one of the ingredients in scenario analysis for regional
development in Eastern Europe in the concluding part.
2. BORDERS AND BARRIER!3
Following Nijkamp et al. [3]  a barrier refers to all obstacles that
cause discontinuities in interaction in time and space. Barriers keep people and
goods apart, or prevent communication and knowledge transfer [4, 5, 63. The
5related term of a border has more a geo-political meaning: it is the line separat-
ing two political or geographical areas, especially countries.
Recently, much attention has been paid to the different nature
of barriers in interaction. Within this framework classifications of barriers have
been based upon at least seven dimensions [3,4,6,7, 81:
the field where barriers occur, i.e. physical, economic, socio-
cultural and time;
the origin of barriers, i.e. natural and man-made, intended and
unintended, primary and derived barriers;
the position of barriers in relation to the network, i.e. internal
(endogenous) and external (exogenous), node barriers and link
barriers;
the organisational setting of barriers, e.g. related to individual
actors or organisations, to symmetric or asymmetric relations-
hips;
the spatial scale, ranging from micro to macro levels;
the time dimension of barriers, i.e. temporal and permanent,
regular and irregular;
the permeability (intensity) of barriers, e.g. absolute closure,
filtering, etc.
Table 1 lists major examples of general barriers by distinguishing
four fields, i.e. physical, economic-political, socio-cultural and time-related, and
by emphasizing the difference between intended and unintended barriers. The
latter type of barriers is often inherent in the nature of interaction or a conse-
quence of other barriers. Intended barriers are imposed for reasons of protection
against access to networks and against transfer of goods or information. Import-
ant examples can be observed in property and ownership regimes, such as patent
protection.
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6Table 1 Potential barriers to interaction
Type of Barrier
-----___--______---_--------- -----__________--------------- __---_-_--___----------------------------
PHYSICAL Spatial distance
Natural obstacle
Congestion (overload)
Lack of safety (criminality)
Missing (small) links in traffic infrastructure
ECONOMIC/POLITICAL
a. Unintended Low supply/demand for networking
Small skill to identify networks (mental map)
High cost of network participation
Property and ownership regimes
Monetary system
Lack of convertibility of currency
Legal system
b . Intended
Instable power structures
Political borders
Trade borders and (fiscal) tariffs
Market regulation
Border customs formalities (waiting time)
Secrecy
SOCIO-CULTURAL
a. Unintended
b . Intended
Language and vocabulary disparities
Educational and income disparities
Cultural behaviour disparities
Network inertia
Political and ideological protection
Social group protection
TIME Peak and off-peak hours
Divergent time zones
---------- ---------- --------- _________________------------------------- ----------------------------
7An often used term in view of barriers is bottlenecks. Bottle-
necks may be regarded as one specific form of barriers, namely the ones in
which transfer or interaction is hindered by an imbalance between actual
capacity in facilities (channels) and desired capacity. Bottlenecks are mostly
physical, such as in traffic infrastructure.
Many barriers to networking occur in the social (cultural)
environment. Language is far the most important barrier here, including spoken,
written and computer language, as well as the vocabulary used in communi-
cation. The latter barrier type follows for example, from different stages in the
development of a technology (basic and applied), and from differences in the
organisational culture between actors [9, lo]. With regard to (remote) border
regions, social (cultural) barriers have often come into existence during centuries
of isolation from the core-area. This may be reflected in a different dialect and
lower educational levels, but more importantly, also in divergent attitudes
following from social class and ideological differences.
A further field where barriers occur is time. In this respect
constraints to interaction arise in two ways. Channels (infrastructure) may not be
able to handle all demand for interaction during a number of peak hours (such
as in telecommunication and physical transport), or handling through particular
channels is delayed on purpose or as a result of indifferent attitudes. The latter
barriers are evident at particular border crossings in Eastern Europe. The second
source of time constraints rests on the system of global time-zones. Interaction
may be hampered by a lack of overlap of working times between the two sides
involved. This holds largely for flows by telephone and is clearly visible in world-
embracing services, such as in banking.
To conclude, a large variety of barriers may obstruct spatial
interaction. Over the past several years, the importance of socio-cultural obsta-
cles has increasingly been emphasized in research on interaction and communi-
cation. Political borders may have vanished and physical borders may have been
overcome, but the socio-cultural differences that have developed as a conse-
8quence  of these borders, may last for a long time. The remaining part of this
section will explore various theoretical views on barrier effects of political
borders. Particular attention will be given to impact of political borders on
economic activity in border regions from the perspective of various classes of
economic theory.
Political borders may have (had) a divergent functional impact
on the surrounding regions. This impact can be classified into three types [ll],
while a fourth type can essentially be added [ 121:
frontier effects: (almost) closed barriers stop or strongly penalize
interaction;
filtering effects: partially permeable barriers distort the intensity
or direction of interaction, or cause a selection of interaction;
polarizing effects: partially open borders cause various types of
contact between political-institutional and socio-economic sub-
systems, leading to zones of attraction;
conditioning effects: borders cause differences in ‘ways of doing
things’, for example in a legal, political and socio-cultural sense.
In conventional theoretical approaches to border region develop-
ment, border regions are often regarded as being economically penalized  [ll].
This situation stems from a specific configuration of political-institutional and
socio-economic factors. In the observations of Christaller [ 131  borders are distor-
ting elements of ‘hinterlands’ causing an incomplete development of cities, also
leading to a rise of overhead costs of investments [ 141.  Liisch [ 151  particularly
observed the negative impacts of custom taxes, limited border crossings and
threat of military action on market areas.
A further conventional approach puts an emphasis on develop-
ment processes of border regions within the wider context of national spaces and
the world economy (particularly in view of spatial division of labour).  In this line
of thinking, border regions offer various attractive features for the location of
,.. ,, / . .’ ..,
9specific production activities. First, border areas anticipate on both sides the
proximity of the other country, leading to various benefits, such as the presence
of economic operators from two or more political-institutional systems. A second
attractive feature concerns the availability of border labour  force, which may be
cheaper, more flexible and have a different motivation of workmanship. The
third reason is essentially cultural. Border regions have a greater ‘permeability’
of the local society, due to an adaptive spirit and a specific valuation of cultural
identity.
In other classes of theory, border regions are associated with
disadvantages due to their remoteness or peripherality in relation to national
cores, both in view of low innovative types of industrial activity and weak power
in decision-making [ 161.
A recently introduced direction in border region development
research involves a dynamic micro approach [ll]. It combines the study of
(vanishing) borders with the analysis of strategic behaviour of companies, while
articulating the removal of barriers and the construction of contact-spaces. The
approach takes the following driving forces behind inter-firm cooperation into
consideration: reduction of uncertainty, reduction of transactions costs (or
control costs of the established inter-firm organization) and demand for inte-
gration.
This paper will adopt the latter micro-behavioral perspective.
Based upon theory and a blend of applied research, it will particularly focus on
the demand for direct investment in Eastern Europe and the uncertainty (risks)
that prevent companies to undertake such action. First however, aggregate
patterns of foreign investment on the national and regional level will be dis-
cussed in a concise way.
3.
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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE
Foreign direct investment in Eastern Europe has clearly
increased in the past years. For example, the stock of foreign direct investment
in Hungary progressed from 569 to 4,376 million US dollars between 1990 and
1993 [l].  To mention an example of an investing country, Dutch direct invest-
ment has grown from 24,3  to 92,3  million DFL per month between 1991 and mid
1993 [ 171  (Table 2). Traditionally, Hungary has been the most popular country.
This can be ascribed to the ‘early’ modes of reform and the politically stable
situation in this country. Dutch investment in Czechoslovakia took off rather late
due to the late reform here. To date, Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic) is the
most popular country in Dutch direct investment.
Table 2 Dutch direct investment in Eastern Europe (million DF’L  per
month)
1991 1992 1993a
Hungary 12,9 17,2 13,4
Poland 994 590 195
Czechoslovakia 198 29,s 55,l
Remaining 092 196 493
Totals 24,3 53,3 92,3
a.
Source:
Average per month for the first eight months.
De Nederlandsche Bank (1993),  in [ 171.
It needs to be emphasized that foreign investment is unequally
spread over the various regions of Eastern Europe [ 18, 191.  Large urban centres
with international airports, modem telecommunication facilities and good living
conditions, and the regions bordering Germany and Austria seem to be most
preferred. The further to the East, the less foreign capital invested, Hungary
being the sole exception to this rule (Figure 1).
I /.’ .._ : . ..’
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Figure 1 Foreign capital invested in Poland, Czech Republic, Slowakia
and Hungary
Source: [I91
It seems that the political ‘iron curtain’ has been succeeded by a
new border, particularly based on a different attraction of Western investment
capital. This new economic border lies however, more to the East.
An attractive theory to explain the demand for direct investment
combines ownership characteristics of the firm with locational factors of the
countries of investment [20]. Accordingly, a company will engage in foreign
direct investment when each of the following three principles is present:
Ownership-specific advantages. The investing firm possesses
particular advantages over indigenous firms, for example, kn-
owledge (patents), human skills, capital and market power.
Such advantages are most suitably exploited by the firm itself
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rather than by selling or leasing them to others; in other words:
the firm internalizes the use of its ownership-specific advantages.
The most important incentive to internalize markets may be un-
certainty [21]. The greater the uncertainty, for example, in view
of the availability, price or quality of supplies, and in view of the
price obtainable for the firm’s  products, the greater the advan-
tage to control these activities.
Location-specific factors. It must be more profitable for the firm
to exploit its assets abroad rather than in domestic locations.
Location-specific factors in Eastern Europe are often associated
with market demand and with cost advantages. Within this
context, the national political climate and attitude to foreign
direct investment are also important.
The above theory does not explain the mode of investment
chosen, such as joint ventures, acquisition of entire (partial) existing firms, and
‘greenfield’ investment. Such detailed strategic behaviour may be explained by
particular opportunities but also by particular barriers perceived by companies
intending to invest. In the next section, attention will particularly focus on
barriers.
4. BARRIERS TO FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
An empirical analysis of barriers to direct investment in Eastern
Europe needs to be based upon case studies and expert opinion [17,  221.  Large
scale surveys which yield information that can be generalized statistically, are
still scarce.
Case study research indicates that the major motivations to
invest in Eastern Europe are cost-related. The most important component in this
I’
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respect seems to be the low wage level. . . “Aslong  as wages are one tenth or less
of Western wages, a cost-related investment is always worth”. . [17]. Relatively
low production costs may also be based on cheap land and cheap equipment.
When cost-motives dominate, products are usually exported from Eastern
Europe. A second group of major motives is market-related. Accordingly, the
investing company aims at a location close to (potential) consumer markets. The
products are often to satisfy primary needs of the population, such as from food
industry.
It should be emphasized that the starting position in which
companies develop investment plans may be crucial in their search behaviour,
negotiation and decision-making on investment. Sensitivity for risk is different
between companies performing well in the home-market and companies in bad
shape (downfall in profits) wanting to reach better results exactly through invest-
ment in Eastern Europe. It is also important to make a difference between
multinationals, and small and medium-sized enterprises. The latter category is
particularly vulnerable because the firms operate in a small segment (niche) of
the market, and have usually small experience in operating abroad. The remain-
ing section will therefore, particularly focus on this type of companies.
First, the barriers an entrepreneur perceives at first sight are
very much dependent upon the image of Eastern European countries. This image
is not simply positive. Whether or not based on actual facts, the media create a
very ambiguous image. On the one hand, they report long lists of serious
inconveniences and threats, such as delay in government payments to companies,
rising taxes, poor phone service, undependable air transportation, conflicting tax
laws and (particularly in Moscow) activity of maffia-like groups forcing busines-
ses to pay extortion money [23]. On the other hand, the media also underline
strong opportunities for investment, a great deal of goodwill in Eastern Europe
and positive learning experiences on both sides.
The following barriers can be distinguished, based upon
experience of individual Western companies and on expert opinion:
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Political risks. These include nationalization, strong shifts in
power, refusal to acknowledge former administration’s decisions,
and ‘power fluidity’ causing uncertainty in outcomes of pro-
cedures and uncertainty about the right persons to negotiate
with.
Legal risks. There is often no legal system based on a free
market economy and when there is a new system, it may be
changed on short term or it has a weak basis because there is no
experience in the specific jurisdiction. These legal risks are
concerned with property rights, bankruptcy, validity of legal
contracts, taxes, etc.
Monetary risks. These follow from the lack of Western currency
in Eastern Europe, while the domestic currency often suffers
from (hyper)inflation.  Investments are usually done in Western
currency but no national bank in Eastern Europe can guarantee
a return on investment in this currency. Various constructions
for ‘escape’ have been created to solve this entrepreneurial risk,
but governments often prohibit such constructions.
So&-cultural  barriers. These stem not only from different
languages and cultural values, but also (and often) from differ-
ent ‘ways of thinking and doing things’. Western entrepreneurs
are not familiar with government decrees, such as concerning
purchase of (building) material in the host country, particularly
when these do not meet price or quality criteria. Cultural risks
include also different skills in corporate management and cost
calculating. Another cultural risk originates in the lack of trans-
parency of structures and procedures. For ‘outsiders’, it is very
time-consuming to get to the bottom of procedures for specific
approvals, details of legal and fiscal system (incentives), and
local habits. A missing local contact-network therefore, may
cause considerable delay.
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Economic barriers associated with relatively low labour  produc-
tivity. It takes considerable time and patience to bring labour
productivity on a higher level, for example by means of an in-
crease of labour  motivation and loyalty. It takes also time to
learn local personnel to take decisions on their own responsibi-
lity.
It is a difficult task to indicate the relative importance of the
above barriers. However, a research among Austrian (Styrian) companies
investing in Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia [22] provides a basis for such a
ranking (Table 3). It appears that political instability and contract risks are by
far the two most important barriers. This is important to note because this type
of barriers refers to very basic needs of certainty in entrepreneurship.
Table 3
Barrier
Barriers perceived by Austrian ‘companies investing in Eastern
Europe
% a  R a n k
Political instability 40 1
Contract risks 2 9 2
Information on potential partners 1 1 314
Low quality of products 11 314
Language barriers 6 5
Contract complications 3 6
a. Frequency of (very) problematic obstacles.
Source: Adapted from [22].
After these general barriers, we now turn to some specific bar-
riers associated with certain investment modes, i.e. acquisition and development
from ‘scratch’. In the case of acquisition, the following barriers may occur:
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a forced transfer of workforce (and their privileges) to the Wes-
tern company; this is particularly an obstacle for investment
when the size of the workforce does not meet the criteria of
profit-seeking;
strong technical inferiority of machinery and back maintenance
of buildings.
The building of new factories (and starting up new operations)
may be hampered due to various delays. In fact, normally only minor problems
are involved, but the sum of them may cause considerable damage, such as:
inefficient procedures at borders leading to a slow down of
importing of equipment, building material, etc. ;
inefficient transactions with banks in Eastern Europe, which is
evident in a ‘disappearance’ of money during a number of weeks
(six to eight weeks is not exceptional).
There is plenty of knowledge about successful investment decisi-
ons. However, there is small knowledge about Western companies which went
through decision-making rather far, but withdrew from their projects in a later
stage. Case study evidence indicates that such a withdrawal occurs under two
conditions (as perceived by Western partners):
Unexpected and ‘unreasonable’ behaviour on the side of the
Eastern European partner or government. A good example is
the government ‘decree’ to adopt hundreds of extra workers or
to pay a large amount of money instead.
An increase in structural ‘mistrust’ based on relatively low skills
of the local participants and fear for a negative impact on
economic results of the investment.
j’
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The above discussion emphasizes a great many risks which may
prevent entrepreneurs form Western countries to invest in Eastern Europe. It is
quite clear that only a successful economic-institutional (including legislation)
and monetary reform can smoothen the path for a further increase in foreign
investment. Such a future reform will be one of the ingredients in scenario
analysis for regional development in Eastern Europe. In this analysis, it is also
taken into account that these countries are actually very different, causing
different border effects and barriers. This will be the subject matter of the next
section.
5. REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE
The transition to a stable democracy and open market-oriented
economy is expected to take place in a different pace throughout Eastern
Europe [ 18, 19, 24, 251.  Due to different development paths under communist
rule and central planning, different natural resources and problems of environ-
mental damage, different national traditions and a divergent (geo-political)
location, future outlooks are better for some countries and regions and worse for
others.
These circumstances clearly cause a variety of border effects,
following for example from monetary (divergent strength of currency) and socio-
cultural (more or less democratic traditions) differences. The borders with
Hungary and Yugoslavia were much more permeable in the past than the ones
for example, with Rumania and the Soviet Union. Hungary began economic
reforms relatively early, so that economic ties could develop at least on an
interregional scale particularly with Austria. Yugoslavia always had a substantial
amount of interaction across the border, as witnessed by labour  force mobility,
consumer trips and openness to foreign tourism. At that time, the latter borders
were really ‘filtering’ borders, open for particular activities but more or less
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closed for others.
The Czech Republic has the strongest democratic roots, which
may help support a fast transition to democratic rule. This newly emerged nation
is noted for its skilled labour,  capital base, a low external debt and enacted plans
to privatize large parts of the economy. Hungary has most experience in rules of
the market economy and in evolutionary political reform, but its economic
recovery suffers from large foreign debts. The latter is even more true for
Poland, a country in which the transition to democracy and a market economy is
also hampered by internal political confrontation.
The newly established states of Slovenia and Croatia and the
Baltic Republics still ‘struggle’ with a consolidation of their independence. On
the other hand, these states have more than any other the opportunity to
establish radically new economic models and new legislation. Their small size
(and domestic markets) requires however, a very strong cooperation with
neighbouring countries. A peculiar feature for at least a part of these small ’
republics is their location in transit zones (such as Slovenia). This brings our
attention to an even more important locational factor, namely the distance to
sources of capital and innovation [ 18, 191.  The following factors are important
here: proximity to an international airport, proximity to a large urban centre, and
proximity to the Western border (to capital from Germany and Austria).
Based on various regional factors, the trend so far seems to be
the following. The larger the distance from a large urban centre and the further
to the East, the weaker the regions’ ability to economic transformation and
growth [18,  19, 241.  In the design of scenarios in the next section we will take
this differentiation into account.
6.
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SCENARIOS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
In recent years, the impact of the political changes on the socio-
economic map of the European Union has become a fascinating new research
field [26].  One important issue is the so-called regional inversion, i.e. the over-
turning of the predominance of advanced or core areas by some previously
peripheral regions. Most recently, research has been carried out on the changing
socio-economic map particularly of Eastern Europe [18,  191.  Here, the major
subject matter is the increase of existing regional disparities (or polarisation) and
the catching up of a few regions with Western Europe.
The first years of transformation in Eastern Europe have shown
a rather clear regional pattern. The most urbanized, traditionally most industrial-
ized (except old, heavy industry) and best equipped (infrastructure) regions seem
to have suffered least from the negative impacts of the structural transformation.
In fact, traditional regional disparities have not disappeared but seem to have
been reinforced in the past years, even leading to polarisation effects.
Economic growth in Eastern European regions in the next
decade is dependent upon the interplay of various factors. In order to design
scenarios, we will particularly consider the following: level of urbanization of the
region, proximity to Western Europe, diversification of the regional economy,
availability of particular natural resources (and their damage), and ability (or
willingness) to economic reform policies by Eastern European governments. The
emerging differences will become evident on two related dimensions, namely (1)
speed of economic growth and (2) degree of integration into the European (or
global) economy (Figure 2). In this context, integration means being a part
(node) in the European economic network, as manifested in for example
transport and communication, and capital investment.
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Figure 2 A classification of scenarios for regional development
1
Forerunners
FAST ECONOMIC
GROWTH
2
Runner-up
Regions
INTEGRATION FRAGMENTATION
3a
I-x&v
Regions
3 b
I-waw
Regions
4
Losing
Regions
SLOW (NEGATIVE)
ECONOMIC GROWTH
The following scenarios of regional development are no clear cut
pieces of thorough scientific investigation, but merely pieces of ‘creative thinking’
aimed to provoke discussion. They should read in that spirit.
1 . Forerunners in economic growth: this scenario seems to be re-
stricted to the large metropoles and a few smaller cities close to
Western European borders. Independent from assistance by the
West, these city regions benefit from their initial (historical)
lead, gateway and transit functions, and strong transborder coop-
eration in reaping the fruits of a strong reform policy. Notable
examples are Prague, Budapest and Bratislava, Poznan and
Warsaw, the latter being an ‘outsider’ regarding its poorly devel-
oped agrarian hinterland. Based upon these leading regions, am
South-North axis may develop including two strong growth
2 1
2 .
3.
4 .
centres (Vienna-Bratislava-Budapest and the Prague region) and
a few smaller growth centres (Ljubljana and Zagreb) in the
South, while being weaker towards the North, leaving two
alternative developments open. One alternative is running
towards the Northeast (including Gdansk) and perhaps ending in
the Baltic States, whereas the other is running towards the West
(including Berlin). Figure 3 indicates such a South-North deve-
lopment axis (named Central European Boomerang) particularly
by considering the Visegrad  nations Poland, the Czech Republic,
Slowakia and Hungary.
Runner-up regions: this scenario is concerned with city-regions
outside the above axis which are able to benefit from a strong
reform policy, among others due to specific economic potentials.
Good examples are transit (distribution) centres attracting new
logistic services and value added manufacturing [27],  and smaller
cities on the edge of National Parks (Natural Reserves) and Spa
regions attracting particular classes of tourism from Western
Europe. A further category includes university towns where
strong links are being established between regional business and
applied modem science, alongside the creation of a small busi-
ness infrastructure.
Lagging regions: this scenario is relevant for metropolitan areas
at large distances from Western Europe, particularly when
reform policy fails. This type of lagging regions (3b) remains
poorly integrated in the European economy (Figure 2). A second
type of lagging regions (3a) is at a shorter distance from Wes-
tern Europe and therefore, potentially more integrated within
Europe. Economic growth is however, hampered by an old (one-
sided) industrial structure (heavy industry and mining) and
strong environmental damage. c
Losing regions: this scenario also supposes a failing economic
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reform policy. It may be true for agrarian regions deep into
Eastern Europe and at far distances from large cities. The
scenario is also true for specific spots which suffer from ethnic
or political tension. Aside from a relatively small (negative)
economic growth, these regions are not or only poorly integrated
in the European economy.
It is clear that these scenarios are not meant to be alternative
forecasts, but just a set of future images which may serve as background frame-
works for strategic policy considerations. There is no doubt that the economic
future of the regions of Eastern Europe is uncertain and that a mobilisation of
all available development forces is a sine qua non. In this context, foreign direct
investment will play a pivotal role.
Eastern Europe needs the benefits of foreign direct investment,
not only to reduce its unemployment but also to help to innovate the production
system. Similar to experiences in medium-developed countries in Latin America
and the Mediterranean, small companies may play a crucial role in the process
of innovation [28,  291.  This means taking active steps in order to develop an
attractive small business infrastructure, for both domestic and foreign small
firms. One major component in such a strategy may be to establish links between
strong knowledge sources at universities and foreign small firms. In this setting,
Eastern Europe may draw on interesting experiences in Western Europe and
elsewhere.
Finally, it is believed that chances for foreign direct investment
in the small and medium-sized business sector are the best when developments
are based upon ‘bottom-up’ initiatives, i.e. partly initiated by local entrepreneurs
and supported by regional business networks or associations [30]. Such a
situation would prevent mistrust and advance local collaboration to the benefit
of both investors and Eastern European local (regional) economies.
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A Central European Boomerang?
/ y--t:
i
-6 3s
-. J
b.-.r
--.w--
--
-8
--
; ’ ,:;i  7 -9-
The Central European ‘BOOMERANG’ - a concentration of transformation processes.
1: present and potential Central European axes; 2: major centres of transformation; 3: cores of transformation; 4: potential
cores of transformation; 5: centres of transformation; 6: main existing or projected highways; 7: Central European ‘Eastern
Wall’;  old industrial regions; 9: regions with tourist potential.
Source:
c
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